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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
LEGISLATIVE FAVORITISM BEFORE THE COURTS*
DANIEL J. DYKSTRAt
It is an amusing, though not insignificant, fact of current political
life that the most vigorous breast beaters against government regulation
and interference are at the same time the most persistent seekers of
government favor and protection. I refer to those collectively known
as "business men." While their spokesmen fervently condemn with dire
warnings the increasing governmental control over all phases of economic
life, special units organized for this very purpose are constantly exerting
pressure on lawmakers-local, state and national-seeking ordinances,
statutes, regulations and favors which will enhance their position on
the economic horizon.' It is small wonder that this fact has caused
one experienced observer of the legislative process to conclude: "Busi-
ness men say that they want less government in business, but that is
what they say and not what they want."'2
In most instances, of course, the organization requesting special
treatment does so with much self-justification, for each group is con-
vinced that what aids its owni interests aids society in general.3 What
is overlooked is the fact that special treatment for one group leads to
compensating demands from other groups. Also ignored is the fact that
special treatment is not, generally speaking, a single-package affair, for
in most instances government favors are of necessity accompanied or
closely followed by government restrictions and regulations. 4
* The writer gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to Professor Monrad Paulsen,
University of Minnesota, for motivating this study through his article entitled, The
Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, published in 34 MINN. L. REv.
91 (1950).
'I B.S. 1938, State Teachers College, River Falls, Wis., Rockefeller Research Fellow,
1947-48, L.L.B. 1948, S.J.D. 1950, University of Wisconsin; Associate Professor of Law,
University of Utah.
1. For comments concerning the number and effects of such measures see Isaacs,
Barrier Activities and the Courts: A Study in Anti-dompetitive Law, 8 LAw & CoNTron,.
PROB. 382 (1941) ; Mclntire and Rhyne, Municipal Legislative Barriers to a Free Market,
8 LAw & CONTE MP. PROB. 359 (1941); Silverman, Bennett, and Lechliter, Control by
Licensing Over Entry Into the Market, 8 LAw & CoNxTEZP. PROB. 234 (1941) ; Graves,
Professional and Occupational Restrictions, 13 TEzp. L.Q. 334 (1939) ; Hanf and Ham-
rick, Haphazard Regimentation Under Licensing Statutes, 17 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1938);
Legis., 22 IowA L. REv. 736 (1937) ; Note, 29 NEB. L. REv. 146 (1949) ; Comment, 48
YALE L.J. 847 (1939); Note, 25 VA. L. REV. 219 (1938).
2. McKFAN, PRESSURES ON THE LEGISLATURE OF NEW JERSEY 56 (1938).
3. The testimony taken by the Buchanan Committee in 1950 amply supports this
observation. See Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
4. George Feldman in an article entitled Legislative Opposition to Chain Stores
and Its Minimization, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 334 (1941) observed:
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Whereas group demands for tariffs, oil rights, support prices, and.
other concessions involving obviously broad economic implications have
received considerable publicity, the less spectacular but more numerous
demands promulgated and effectuated by various economic units have
received in comparison little attention and analysis.5 These demands are
reflected in the licensing laws, the fair trade acts, the itinerant peddler
prohibitions, the inspection ordinances, and the occupational revenue
measures which are constantly turned out at 'all levels of government.
Admittedly, these enactments taken individually seem insignificant, but
when viewed in toto their impact cannot be ignored. Until compre-
hensive and specialized studies are made, any appraisal of the over-all
effects of these measures on the economy represent mere guesswork, but
certainly it may be said that their influence on the price structure, on
the availability of goods and services, on the entrance of new competitors
into a given field, and above all on the extent of government in business,
is not inconsequential.
Broadly speaking, the enactments in question may be classified into
two general categories. 6 In one group are found the measures primarily
produced at the state and national levels which seek to enable businessmen
with limited means to compete on a greater degree of equality with those
possessing more capital. Fair trade laws, 7 anti-price discrimination laws,
"Pressure groups that are too successful usually end by going too far and destroying
all that they have accomplished. The anti-chain store campaign seems well along
this road. In an attempt to extend their gains, the wholesale and retail merchants
who- are behind the movement are alienating many of their own number-persons
who formerly backed, or at least did not oppose, chain store legislation." Id. at 342-43.
The author goes on to observe that Mr. Hector Lazo, head of the National Retailer
Owned Grocers' Association once noted: "A law passed today to put your competitor
out of business may whack you between the eyes tomorrow." Id. at 344.
5. While, as may be noted in &iote 1, this field of legislation has not been totally
neglected there is still merit to the lament of the political scientist who in 1939 observed
that with a few exceptions "practically nothing has been done by students of govern-
ment and law, by way of analysis of the problems of legislation and administration
which these laws create." Graves, Professional and Occupational Restrictions, 13 TEMP.
L.Q. 334 (1939).
6. This classification is suggested by a comment published in 48 YALE. L.J. 847
(1939).
7. In view of the fact that the fair trade laws had their birth in anti-chain store,
anti-bigness sentiment, it is somewhat ironic to note the following observation made
by the Federal Trade Commission in a publication entitled a REPoRT ON RESALE PRIcE
MAINTENANCE (1945). In appraising the effects of such legislation, the report stated:
"After resale price maintenance became effective, the price advances forced upon large
distributors, especially for a number of brands handled by the drug trade, yielded larger
gross margin percentages to large retail distributors than to individual drug stores as
a class in the same market, although the latter, in general, sold the brands at higher
prices than the former. Thus, it would seem that the large distributors had a real
advantage in pricing their goods, possibly because they purchased in larger quantities
directly from manufacturers whereas small retailers were purchasing in smaller
quantities from wholesalers and paying higher prices." Id. at 258.
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* and anti-chain store legislation s are illustrative of this type. In the second
group are found those measures enacted most frequently by local and
state law'makers which seek to regulate and control the entrance of com-
petitors into prescribed areas. This is sought to be accomplished either
by closely supervising the admittance of new members into a given trade
or profession or by regulating those who seek to invade a given geo-
graphic-political unit, a city, town, or county, for purposes of soliciting
business.
The anti-chain store, anti-bigness type of regulation, while incon-
sistent with traditional concepts of laissez-faireism, is none the less in
keeping with the philosophy which resulted in the enactment of anti-
trust laws. That philosophy is grounded on the theory that numerous
competing independent units result in the most desirable economy. To
some extent it may be argued that measures which seek to protect a
given geographic unit also fall into this field of justification, for rapid
means of transportation and distribution have enabled big corporations
to exploit markets which at one time were the exclusive domain of the
local independent retailers or producers. 9 Thus, for example, local dairies,
bakeries, ice cream plants, and dry cleaning establishments which at one
time had a small but settled market are today faced with the necessity
of competing with outside enterprises whose agents and facilities are
successfully canvassing "their territory." 10
While it thus may be conceded that in some instances the impetus
behind many of the measures in question stems from a desire to compete
successfully with business units possessing greater productive and dis-
tributive capacity, it must also be recognized that many of these enact-
ments result in closing the door of economic opportunity to individuals
and business units of limited capital and experience. Laws which regulate
access to a given geographic unit may interfere with the free and easy
market desired by large corporations, but at the same time they also
constitute barriers to the individual entrepreneurs, to the itinerant
peddlers, and to other businessmen with restricted resources. Further,
measures which prescribe courses, periods of training, license fees, and
examinations for purposes of controlling entrance into a given trade or
profession may frequently prove formidable obstacles to many who nor-
8. For a comprehensive treatment of anti-chain store legislation see Feldman,
Legislative Opposition to Chain Stores and Its Minimization, 8 LANw & CONTEmP. PROB.
334 (1941).
9. See Comment, 48 YALE L.J. 847, 848-49 (1939).
10. For a case illustrating a situation of this type, see Real Silk Hosiery Mills
v. City of Portland, 268 U.S. 352 (1925).
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mally would find their means of livelihood in one of these fields of
enterprise.11
Admittedly, the reasons given for establishing restrictions to the
traditionally easy entrance into a given trade or an established geographic
area are many and not without merit. The local businessman who pays
taxes, who supports with talents, time, and money the churches, schools,
and charities of his community, quite naturally feels that competition
from outsiders who are not required to make an equivalent contribution
represents unfair competition. 12  Trades and professions contend, with
some degree of logic, that the public must be assured competent services
and reputable goods. This they maintain can only be achieved by regtu-
lations which not only serve to eliminate impostors but also seek to
assure competency.' 3  Therefore, to the extent that these measures are
needed for and to the degree which they accomplish these objectives, even
though the result of partly selfish motives, they are not without justifi-
cation.
Although the economic consequences of these licensing and regula-
tory laws are in serious need of further study, the problem with which this
discussion is immediately concerned is the attitude of the courts toward
this legislation, particularly that category which seeks to regulate and
control the entrance of competitors into a prescribed area. Of course,
the number of such enactments is in itself evidence that the judiciary
has frequently sustained such measures.' 4  Nevertheless, the decisions
handed down since 1935 reveal that on numerous occasions and for a
variety of reasons courts have seen fit to declare certain of these enact-
11. In an article entitled Control by Licewsing Over Entry Into the Market, 8
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 234 (1941) by Silverman, Bennett, and Lechliter, the follow-
ing observation was made in discussing various provisions frequently contained in
licensing legislation: "These particular requirements, however, when applied to the
ordinary trades of barbering, cosmetology, plumbing, building, watchmaking, or photog-
raphy, frequently assume a more onerous aspect. At least a potential danger arises
that many an honest, conscientious man or woman will be deprived of earning a liveli-
hood. Such statutes may readily operate to restrict the number of persons who may
engage in a particular occupation, and also lead, in some degree, to the control of
competition and price. Whether this result is desirable or undesirable depends upon
one's views with relation to our economic society." Id. at 238.
12. For a more extended discussion of this observation see Jensen, Burdening
Interstate Direct Selling Under Clains of State Police Power, 12 RocKY MT. L. REv.
257 (1940).
13. See Graves, Professional and Occupational Restrictions, 13 TE11. L.Q. 334
(1939).
14. In 1939, a study published by Professor Graves, supra note 13, listed over
100 professions, trades and occupations which are frequently subjected to licensing
requirements. The average number in effect in each of the 48 states was, at that date,
43. Id. at 338.
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ments invalid. The judicial obstacles thus created are worthy of close
observation.
Before considering these obstacles in detail, however, an examina-
tion of the general attitude and approach taken by various courts to this
area of the law will be profitable. Many opinions, taking their cue from
pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in such cases as
Powell v. Pennsylvania,'5 O'Gornian and Young v. Hartford Fire Insur-
ance Co.,16 Nebbia v. New York, 17 and Olsen v. Nebraska,18 reiterate
the observation that every presumption is in favor of the validity of the
statute under consideration. This observation is usually supplemented by
the comment that the court is not concerned with the wisdom of the
enactment, for its task is simply to review the sufficiency of the evidence
upon which constitutionality is rested.' 9 "If the laws passed are seen to
have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory, ' 20 that is sufficient. Further, many courts,
when confronted by arguments advanced by counsel to the effect that
an enactment under consideration is but the selfish product of a particular
pressure group, have seen fit to observe that they cannot be concerned
with the source from which a law originated or with the motives of
those instrumental in securing its passage. 2' For example, Mr. Justice
Murphy, in considering a South Carolina statute which provided that
undertakers could not serve as life insurance agents,22 remarked:
It is said that the "insurance lobby" obtained this statute
from the South Carolina legislature. But a judiciary must
judge by results, not by the varied factors which may have
determined legislators' votes. We cannot undertake a search
for motive in testing constitutionality.
2
15. 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
16. 282 U.S. 251 (1931).
17. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
18. 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
19. For examples of opinions which express these concepts see Kress and Co.
v. Johnson, 16 F. Supp. 5 (D. Colo. 1936); Buehman v. Bechtel, 57 Ariz. 363, 114
P.2d 227 (1941); Auston v. Wilson, 27 Cal.App.2d 124, 80 P.2d 503 (1938); Liquor
Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d, 371 (Fla. 1949); Moore v. Grillis,
205 Miss. 865, 39 So.2d 505 (1949); Nelsen v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 327, 289 N.W. 388
(1939).
20. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
21. E.g., Daniel v. Family Security Life Insurance Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949);
Eddy v. Morgan, 216 Il. 437, 75 N.E. 174 (1905); State v. Bushfield, 69 S.D. 172,
8 N.W.2d 1 (1943).
22. Daniel v. Family Security Life Insurance Co., supra note 21.
23. Id. at 224.
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He further added:
We cannot say that South Carolina is not entitled to call the
funeral insurance business an evil. Nor can we say that the
statute has no relation to the elimination of those evils. There
our inquiry must stop.
24
Despite such frequent assertions of judicial restraint, it is impossible
to escape the conclusion that in this area of the law many courts merely
pay lip service to such language, for in many instances their conclusions
as to constitutionality seem to be determined by the personal predilection
of individual judges to the specific measure before them.25 Here again,
lower courts take their lead from the Supreme Court, for its performance
in the social-economic field and in the interstate commerce area2 6 reflects
that it has left itself open to follow a variety of paths depending upon
its attitude towards the challenged legislation. While frequently the Court
has talked the presumption language and has reached a conclusion in
accord with such an approach, 27 it has on other occasions substituted its
own impressions as to existing social-economic facts for purposes of
reaching desired conclusions. Thus, in Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan,28 a
case concerned with the constitutionality of a statute prescribing stan-
dardized sizes for loaves of bread, the majority, speaking through Justice
Butler, said:
There is no evidence in support of the thought that purchasers
have been or are likely to be induced to take a 9Y2 or a 10 ounce
loaf for a pound (16 ounce) loaf . . .and it is contrary to
common experience and unreasonable to assume that there could
be any danger of such deception. 9  -
This remark not only reflects a judicial indifference to the presump-
tion of constitutionality but it is also in error, for as the dissent by Justice
Brandeis so aptly disclosed, with specific facts drawn from a variety of
sources, purchasers had been deceived when buying loaves of bread.30
24. Ibid.
25. This impression seems especially apparent in Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental
Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949); Moore v. Grillis, 205 Miss. 865, 39 So.2d
505 (1949); Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton, 138 Ohio St. 540, 38 N.E.2d 70
(1941) ; Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 58 A.2d 464 (1948).
26. For a comprehensive discussion of recent decisions concerned with interstate
commerce questions, see Barrett, State Tdxation of Interstate Commerce: "Direct
Burdens," "Multiple Burdens" or What Have Yoia? 4 VAND. L. REv. 496 (1951).
27. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313
U.S. 236 (1941).
28. 264 U.S. 504 (1924).
29. Id. at 517.
30. For an excellent discussion of the Burns Baking Co. casi and other cases
reflecting the Courts' approach to facts, see DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAWV§ 153 (1951).
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While it may be that the Supreme Court has come to exercise greater
caution than is evidenced by Mr. Justice Butler's remark, it is none the
less true that certain recent cases, as has been noted in dissenting opinions.
have been decided upon assumed but disputable facts. 31
Because the comment by Mr. Justice Murphy to the effect that
courts should not determine the validity of a statute by the "varied
factors which may determine legislators' votes" is at best an artificial
and unsatisfactory rule, it is not surprising that it too has not been a
constant guide to judicial action. In fact the good Justice himself could
not help but observe in his separate concurring opinion in the Takahaszi
case 32 that the statute under consideration, one which prohibited the
issuances of a commercial fishing license to any "alien Japanese," was
but the result of the "anti-Japanese fever which has been evident in
California in varying degrees since the turn of the century." 33  He
further added:
That fever, of course, is traceable to the refusal or the inability
of certain groups to adjust themselves economically and socially
relative to residents of Japanese ancestry. 3
4
In a similar vein, other courts have noted and have been influenced
by the fact that measures whose validity were being attacked had their
origins in the desires of limited groups to gain economic advantage. 'The
Court of Appeals of Kentucky, for example, observed that it was
revealed at trial that a city ordinance, which sought to place an annual
tax of $200 on all non-resident launderers soliciting business in the city,
was drawn because "the Weed Laundry (a local concern) was objecting
to appellant's carrying on business 'without a license.' ,,35 It was also
noted that the Weed Laundry had agreed to pay the expenses of testing
the validity of an ordinance if the license fee for the service business
was fixed at $600.36 These facts aided the court in concluding that the
ordinance was passed to prohibit, not to regulate, and that as a conse-
quence it could not be said to serve a public purpose. The Supreme
31. For example, in his dissent in Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 71 Sup.Ct. 295
(1951), Mr. Justice Black pointed out that the majority, in suggesting that reasonable
alternatives existed which would accomplish what the ordinance intended, were in
effect assuming that such was the case. He adds, "I do not think that the Court
can so satisfy itself on the basis of its judicial knowledge." Id. at 300. See also the
dissents by Mr. Justice Douglas in Dennis v. United States, 71 Sup.Ct. 857, 903 (1951)
and in Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 435 (1946).
32. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
33. Id. at 422, 423.
34. Id. at 423.
35. Southern Lines Linen Supply Co. v. City of Corbin, 272 Ky. 787, 790, 115
S.W.2d 321, 323 (1938).
36. Ibid..
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Court of Michigan, in considering an ordinance providing for the licens-
ing of those engaged in the florist business, was impressed by testimony
of various witnesses to the effect that the measure was lobbied through
by a florist association for the purpose of "getting rid of those people
who sold on the streets." 37 This fact, the court commented, demonstrated
that:
The object of the present ordinance was not to protect the citi-
zens of Detroit in their public health, safety, morals or general
welfare, but was for the financial benefit of a few.38
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in determining the constitutionality
of a statute which prescribed that those desiring to engage in the business
of renting motor vehicles without drivers must secure a certificate of
public convenience from the Public Utility Commission and must charge
rates not lower than the rates charged by common carriers was disturbed
by the fact that this measure was prepared and introduced by an affiliate
of the Yellow Cab Company. This act, the justices concluded, was noth-
ing but an "attempt to regulate and control a private business and it does
that simply in the interest of common or contract carriers by motor
vehicles and not for any discernible public purpose."
39
The preceding examples are sufficient to illustrate that many courts
openly take note of the origins and -motives which prompt certain enact-
ments. While, as observed, this approach has on occasion been condemned
by the courts themselves, 40 it is nevertheless one which takes stock of
the facts of political life. Furthermore, it may be argued with consid-
erable justification that knowledge as to the inspiration behind and the
forces instrumental in securing the introduction and enactment of a
given measure will shed valuable light on the question of whether it is,
for example, an abuse of the police power in that it is unreasonable and
arbitrary.41
37. Kresge Co. v. Mayor of Detroit, 290 Mich. 185, 191, 287 N.W. 427, 429, 430(1939).
38. Id. at 192, 387 N.W. at 430.
39. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 41, 58 A.2d 464, 478
(1948).
40. For illustrative cases, see note 21, supra.
41. In this connection ;the following observation of Mr. Justice Day, speaking
for the Supreme Court in Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904), is of more
than passing interest. After noting the ordinance in question was passed under rather
peculiar circumstances, he continued: "It is urged that, where the exercise of legis-
lative or municipal power is clearly within constitutional limits, the courts will not
inquire into the motives which may have actuated the legislative body in passing the
law or ordinance in question. Whether, when it appears that the facts would authorize
the exercise of the power, the courts will restrain its exercise because of alleged
wrongful motives inducing the passing of an ordinance, is not a question necessary
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
A further factor which should be mentioned in appraising the
general attitude and approach of various courts in this field of activity
is the frequency with which they have seen fit to ground their decisions,
either in part or in entirety, upon state constitutional provisions rather
than upon the Federal Constitution.42 This is true even though sections
of the Federal Constitution have been pleaded and were involved in the
controversy. The significance of this approach lies in the fact that it
permits state courts, when construing provisions in state constitutions,
to reach results not entirely compatible with the interpretations placed-
by the Supreme Court upon similar clauses in the Federal Constitution.
Thus, it has been noted that many state supreme courts have persisted
in giving the due process clause contained in state constitutions a less
elastic interpretation than that recently adopted by the Supreme Court
in construing the due process limitations of the United States Constitu-
tion.43  In fact, some state courts being cognizant of this development
have asserted it in a somewhat belligerent vein. The Ohio court, for
example, after observing that the people of Ohio have long relied both
on the guarantees of the federal and state constitutions, added:
If in the midst of current trends towards regimentation of
persons and property, this long history of parallelism [that is,
between the interpretation of guarantees contained in the United
States and state constitutions] seems threatened by a narrowing
federal interpretation of federal guaranties, it is well to remem-
ber that Ohio is a sovereign state and that the fundamental
guaranties of the Ohio Bill of Rights have undiminished vital-
ity. Decision here may be and is bottomed on those guaran-
ties.44
It would of course be a mistake to assume that all state courts feel
equally free to ignore the interpretation by the Supreme Court of a
constitutional guarantee. As Professor Paulsen pointed out in a recent
to be determined in this case; but where the facts as to the situation and conditions
are such as to establish the exercise of the police power in such manner as to oppress
or discriminate against a class or an individual, the courts may consider and give
weight to such purpose in considering the validity of the ordinance." Id. at 240.
42. E.g., Buehman v. Bechtel, 57 Ariz. 363, 114 P.2d 227 (1941) ; State Board of
Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind. 552, 44 N.E-2d 972 (1942) ; Moore v. Grillis, 205
Miss. 865, 39 So.2d 505 (1949) ; Nelsen v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 327, 289 N.W. 388 (1939) ;
State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 831 (1949); State v. Cromwell, 72 N.D.
565, 9 N.W.2d 914 (1943); Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. City of Dayton, 138 Ohio
St. 540, 38 N.E.2d 70 (1941); Williams v. City of Richmond, 177 Va. 477, 14 S.E.2d
387 (1941).
43. For ample evidence supporting this observation, see Paulsen, The Persistence
of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REv. 91 (1950).
44. Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. City of Dayton, 138 Ohio St. 540, 545, 38
N.E.2d 70, 73 (1941).
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article, many state courts have expressly followed analogous federal cases
in construing their similar state pirovisions. "Indeed," he adds, "to fol-
low similar federal cases in the absence of cogent reasons for departing
therefrom has become in some states a doctrine of state constitutional
construction." 45 This not being a universal practice, however,, state court
interpretation of state constitutional guarantees, which are opposed to
interpretations under federal constitutional stipulations, demands recog-
nition if one is to understand judicial action in the area with which this
article is concerned.
Having, noted the general factors relating to the judicial approach,
an examination will be made of the specific pitfalls which have resulted
in the invalidation of several measures concerned with limiting the
entrance of competitors into a given trade or area. In doing so, it should
of course be repeated that the majority of enactments in "this field have
not fallen prey to constitutional limitations. 46 Those which have fallen
before judicial scrutiny are, however, sufficiently numerous to warrant
analysis.
One of the barriers which municipal ordinances of this nature have
occasionally found insurmountable is that created by the narrow interpre-
tation of the authority delegated to municipalities by the legislature or
in some instances by the applicable state constitution. 47  This approach
suggests a lack of judicial sympathy for the enactments involved. In
Ex parte Holmes 48 the Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to sustain a
tax on itinerant photographers on the rather doubtful assertion that the
power to tax was not included in the power to "license and regulate."
At an earlier date the Iowa court, taking a similarly narrow position,
held that an itinerant optician who tested eyes and solicited orders for
glasses was not subject to a statute which authorized cities to regulate,
license, and tax "transient merchants."' 40 In Texas the Court of Criminal
Appeals, although recognizing that it was acting contra to the decisions
of a majority of courts, held that an ordinance prohibiting door to door
solicitation of private residences without having been requested to do so
by their occupants was invalid, for such authority was not included in
45. Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First AinendnWent Freedom,,
4 VAND. L. Rzv. 620, 621-622 (1951). As the author notes, this is a principal enunciated
by the Oregon court in City of Portland v. Thornton, 174 Ore. 508, 149 P.2d 972 (1944).
46. This fact is amply demonstrated by the materials cited -in note 1 supra.
47. E.g., Bryan v. Malvern, 122 Ark. 379, 183 S.W. 957 (1916); City of Waukon
v. Fish, 124 Iowa 464, 100 N.W. 475 (1904); City of Mankato v. Fowler, 32 Minn.
364, 20 N.W. 361 (1884); x parte Holmes, 162 Okla. 30, 18 P.2d 1053 (1933); Ex
Parte Falkner, 143 Tex. Cr. 272, 158 S.W.2d 525 (1942).
48. See note 47 supra.
49. City of Waukon v. Fish, 124 Iowa 464, 100 N.W. 475 (1904).
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the normal police powers possessed by municipalities nor was that right
delegated by the legislature.50
A second and more formidable hurdle to the constitutionality of
these measures is Article I, Section 8, the interstate commerce clause
of the Federal Constitution. While it is beyond the scope of this article
to review the present confused state of the commerce cases, 1 it should
be observed that in numerous instances the federal and state courts have
invalidated ordinances and statutes imposing franchise, licensing, or priv-
ilege taxes and requirements upon those seeking to do business in a given
territory, on the grounds that they represent undue or discriminating
burdens on interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court decision of this nature which has recently had
great influence on the state courts is that of Nippert v. Richmond,5 2
decided in 1945. This action was concerned with a municipal ordi-
nance enacted in Richmond, Virginia, which required from all agents,
solicitors, persons, firms, or corporations "engaged in business as solici-
tors" an annual license tax of "$50.00 and one-half of one per centum of
the gross earnings, receipts, fees or commissions for the preceding license
year in excess of $1,000.00." Counsel for the City of Richmond recog-
nized that similar enactments had been declared unconstitutional, but
argued that recent judicial developments had impaired the efficacy of
these so-called "drummer" decisions. Particular reliance was placed upon
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co.5 3 In that case the Court held that a
sales tax imposed by the City of New York upon coal shipped in from
Pennsylvania pursuant to contracts of sale previously made in New
York was not an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce.
The City of Richmond insisted that the license tax which it sought to
exact was fundamentally indistinguishable from the New York tax.
The majority of the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Rutledge,
refused to concede the validity of this argument. After repeating the
50. Ex parte Faulkner, 143 Tex. Cr. 272, 158 S.W.2d 525 (1942). During the
past term the United States Supreme Court ruled that an ordinance similar to the one
involved in Ex parte Faulkner was a proper exercise of the police power. See Breard
v. City of Alexandria, 71 Sup.Ct. 920 (1951). The validity of similar measures was
also sustained in McCormick v. City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 99 P.2d 969 (1939);
Shreveport v. Cunningham, 190 La. 481, 182 So. 649 (1938); City of Alexandria v.
Jones, 216 La. 923, 45 So.2d 79 (1950); Green v. Gallup, 46 N.M. 71, 120 P.2d 619
(1941); People v. Bohnke, 287 N.H. 154, 38 N.E.2d 478 (1941); Green River v.
Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P.2d 456 (1936).
51. See note 26 supra.
52. 327 U.S. 416 (1945). To note the substantial influence which this case has had
on recent state court decisions, see Nicholson v. Forrest City, 216 Ark. 808, 228 S.W.2d
53 (1950) ; Graves v. City of Gainesville, 78 Ga. 186, 51 S.E.2d 58 (1948) ; Warran Kay
Vantine Studios, Inc. v. City of Portsmouth, 95 N.H. 171, 59 A.2d 476 (1948).
53. 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
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oft-noted observation that not all burdens on interstate commerce but
only undue or discriminatory ones are forbidden, the Court- stated that
the New York City tax fell equally upon all-whether local or out-of-
state-in direct proportion to the volume of business. On the other hand,
the tax imposed by the City of Richmond presented an initial barrier of
$50.00, which sum had no relation to the extent or volume of business.
This feature meant, Rutledge commented, that the "'small operator par-
ticularly and more especially the casual or occasional one from out-of-
state will find the tax not only burdensome but prohibitive, with the
result that the commerce is stopped before it is begun. ' ' 4 While it is
true, the opinion goes on to observe, that the ordinance on its face applies
to all solicitors, whether engaged in soliciting for local or for interstate
business, none the less in actual operation, because of differences in loca-
tion and means of doing business, it is likely to fall most heavily on
non-local trade.
With these arguments based as they primarily were on an assess-
ment of the manner in which the law probably operated in the world of
commerce, the Court again revealed-that it would scrutinize with care
measures which attempted to regulate or exclude competition within or
from a given area. If the effect of such enactments was to place upon
interstate commerce burdens greater than those borne by strictly local
transactions, they could not be sustained.
The approach thus noted was carried one step further during the
most recent term of the Supreme Court. In Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,15
the Justices were confronted with an ordinance passed in the name of
public health by the City of Madison, Wisconsin. One section of this
enactment made it unlawful to sell within the municipality any milk as
pasteurized unless it was processed and bottled at an approved pasteuriza-
tion plant within a radius of five miles from the central square of the
city. This ordinance was challenged by an Illinois corporation whose
two pasteurization plants were located 65 and 85 miles respectively from
Madison. A reading of the Court's opinion, which concluded that the
stipulated limitation imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce,
makes it apparent that the majority, speaking through Mr. justice Clark,
was influenced by doubts concerning the bona fide nature of this enact-
ment. In other words, the opinion reflects that the majority was con-
vinced that this was a measure designed primarily to raise an economic
barrier to protect a major local industry rather than to insure a sanitary
54. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 420 (1945).
55. 71 Sup.Ct 295 (1951),
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milk supply.5'8 Despite such skepticism, the precise holding does not
directly challenge the claim that this ordinance is a health measure.
Instead, the Court in effect concludes that even if this is a health measure
it cannot be sustained provided "reasonable nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives" are available. The majority then proceeds to point out "reasonable
alternatives."
It is this approach which called forth from Mr. Justice Black a
vigorous dissent, concurred in by Justices Douglas and Minton. Whereas
the "reasonable alternative" concept has been invoked to protect First
Amendment rights,5 7 it has not, Black maintained, "heretofore been con-
sidered an appropriate weapon for striking down local lealth laws."
He then added:
No case is cited, and I have found none, in which a bona fide
health law was struck down on the ground that some other
method of safeguarding health would be as good as, or better
than, the one the Court was called on to review. In my view,
to use this ground now elevates the right to traffic in com-
merce for profit above the power of the people to guard the
purity of their daily diet of milk.58
If one fears, as Mr. Justice Black evidently does, that the test
suggested in the majority opinion will lead to the indiscriminate sub-
stitution of judicial policy concepts for those of the legislature, then
truly there is cause for alarm. Such fear, however, seems to be unwar-
ranted. Even if the majority meant to suggest the "reasonable alterna-
tive approach" as a standard one for legislation of this nature, it is
submitted that this is not as new nor as revolutionary as the dissent
implies. While the words "reasonable alternative" may not have been
used heretofore in this field, none the less it seems inevitable that a
consideration of other available remedies must frequently have entered
into the determination of whether a particular measure was a reasonable
non-discriminatory approach to certain objectives. In fact, it would
appear the Court is compelled to entertain this weighing of solutions
if it is to fulfill the constitutional demands of equal protection and due
process. Measures which impose heavy burdens that are unnecessary
to accomplish desired objectives and which may easily be avoided by
another avenue of approach fail to meet these requirements.
56. For example, Mr. Justice Clark in referring to the ordinance said, "In thus
erecting an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against competition
from without the State, Madison plainly discriminates against interstate commerce."
Id. at 298.
57. Citing Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
58. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 71 Sup.Ct. 295, 300 (1951).
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Irrespective of these considerations, it is suggested that the dissent
interpreted the majority opinion too literally. The key to Mr. Justice
Clark's approach obviously rests on the observation already made, namely
on the skepticism as to the bona fide nature of the enactment under con-
sideration. While it is unfortunate that the majority did not directly
give voice to this fact, it was none the less a significant element in the
case and may in the future constitute a point of departure for those
who do not approve of the directness of the suggested test. Be that as
it may, the fact remains that the majority opinion reveals that the inter-
state commerce clause continues to be a judicial hurdle to measures which
seek to protect, without sufficient justification, local areas of trade. 59
An additional obstacle to this legislation, one to which reference
has already been made, is that created by the equal protection provisions
of federal and state constitutions. Repeatedly the courts have held that
classifications between residents and non-residents,60 citizens and non-
citizens, 61 or between certain merchants6 2 are not a sufficiently reason-
able distinction to permit the exaction of burdensome licensing fees or
the denial of certain economic rights and privileges. Thus, the Supreme
Court declared invalid a California statute which prohibited the issuance
of commercial fishing licenses to persons "ineligible to citizenship." 63 It
also invalidated a South Carolina measure which required non-residents
to pay a license fee of $2,500 for each shrimp boat, while residents were
required to pay only $25.00. 4 For a similar reason the Kansas Supreme
Court upset an ordinance which exacted $1.00 a day or $10.00 a
year from those operating a bakery in the City of Humbolt but assessed
those bakers not owning or operating their bakeries within the city
$1.50 a day or $120.00 a year.65 A Missouri court reacted similarly to
an ordinance passed by the City of St. Joseph which required those who
solicited laundry which was to be sent outside the city to file a bond of
59. For examples of enactment invalidated by state courts on the basis that they con-
stitute improper interference with interstate commerce, see Nicholson v. Forrest City,
216 Ark. 808, 228 S.W.2d 53 (1950); Graves v. City of Gainesville, 78 Ga. 186, 51
S.E.2d 28 (1948); Warran Kay Vantine Studios, Inc. v. City of Portsmouth, 95 N.H.
171, 59 A.2d 475 (1948).
60. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Speier's Laundry Co. v. City of
Wilber, 131 Neb. 606, 269 N.W. 119 (1936); N. J. Good Humor v. Bradley Beach,
124 N.J.L 162, 11 A.2d 113 (1940); Ex parte Davis, 72 Okla. Cr. 152, 114 P.2d 186
(1941) ; State v. Yetter, 192 S.C. 1, 5 S.E.2d 291 (1939).
61. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1947).
62. Brackman v. Kruse, 122 Mont. 91, 199 P.2d 971 (1948).
63. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1947).
64. Toomer v. Whitsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1947).
65. Hair v. City of Humbolt, 133 Kan. 67, 299 Pac. 268 (1931).
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$2,000 with the city and to submit to the license inspector on each occa-
sion a list of the articles which were to be removed from the city.66
While the courts in these and in the many other cases based on a
similar rationalization have universally proclaimed the right of the legis-
lature to enact licensing and regulatory measures for reasons properly
within the scope of the police powers or revenue raising authority when
based upon reasonable distinctions, the refrain which constantly asserts
itself in the courts' analysis of these measures is that they are primarily
enactments to promote the economic interests of a limited group. The
Missouri court, for example, proclaimed that in its opinion the laundry
ordinance, noted in the preceding paragraph, was passed for the "sole
purpose of stifling competition for the benefit of local establishments." 67
The Nebraska Supreme Court in considering another measure designed
to regulate launderers observed that the mayor frankly testified that the
ordinance was "for the protection of home industry." "This ordinance,"
the court went on to state, "taxes the home industry only one-tenth of
the tax levied against non-residents by the city although both classes
performed the same type of service."'68 The New Jersey Court of Errors
and Appeals spoke with equal directness in declaring invalid an ordinance
designed to prohibit hawking and house-to-house peddling within the
borough of Bradley Beach when it said:
It is . . . evident that the challenged municipal action was
dictated by a purpose to shield the local shopkeepers from
lawful competition, and thus to serve private interests in con-
travention of common rights; and so it must be condemned as
an abuse of the police power, and therefore ultra vires. It does
not purport to be a reasonable exercise of the police power-in
the public interest by means reasonably necessary for the pur-
pose.8 9
These illustrations may again be multiplied. They are 'sufficient,
however, to demonstrate that in many instances the courts are guided
in concluding certain measures are unreasonable and discriminatory and
thus violative of equal protection requirements by the fact that the enact-
ments are too patently designed, not to promote health and welfare or to
raise revenue, but to aid limited economic groups. The judiciary, it is
evident, has felt on many occasions that it must serve as arbiter in bal-
66. Ex parte Beckenstein, 104 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1937).
67. Id. at 406.
68. Speier's Laundry Co. v. City of Wilber, 131 Neb. 606, 608, 269 N.W. 119,
120 (1936).
69. N. J. Good Humor, Inc. v. Bradley Beach, 124 N.J.L. 162, 171, 11 A.2d 113,
118 (1940).
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ancing conflicting economic interests; that its intervention is warranted
when measures for no "legitimate reasons" promote the welfare of the
few at the expense of the many!'
Closely allied to the barriers raised by the equal protection clause
are the obstacles created by due process requirements found in the federal
and state constitutions. It is here particularly that certain state courts
have felt free to deviate from recent interpretations and trends observ-
able in Supreme Court decisions. As a consequence the due process
requirements of various state constitutions continue to be significant
weapons in the social-economic field.
While due process requirements have in certain instances proved
fatal to legislation designed to protect a given geographic area,71 they
have been especially formidable obstacles to measures which seek to
regulate specific trades or occupations and to enactments which prescribe
and regulate the entrance of new participants into these means of liveli-
hood. Statutes, for example, which require commercial photographers
applying for licenses to submit to examinations, have been consistently
invalidated on the basis that they deprive individuals of liberty and
property without due process of law.72 For this reason an ordinance
enacted in Baltimore, Maryland, which sought to set up requirements for
paper hangers who desired to operate in that city was declared invalid.7 3
A similar 'fate was visited upon an Indiana statute which sought to
delegate authority to an administrative board to prescribe prices and
hours which might be maintained by barbers in designated area. 74
It is unfortunate that in reaching such results many courts frequently
indulge in language packed with clich6s and general conclusions rather
than precise analytical arguments. In many instances measures of this
nature are dismissed with the rather cryptic observation that they have
70. For a similar conclusion see Paulsen, The Persistence of Substalaive Due
Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REv. 91, 117-118 (1950).
71. E.g., Southern Lines Linen Supply Co. v. City of Corbin, 272 Ky. 787, 115
S.W.2d 321 (1938); Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N.H. 64, 174 Atl. 193 (1934).
72. See Buehman v. Bechtel, 57 Ariz. 363, 114 P.2d 227 (1941); Sullivan v.
De Cerb, 156 Fla. 496, 23 So.2d 571 (1945) ; Bramley v. State, 187 Ga. 826, 2 S.E.2d
647 (1939) ; State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 513 S.E.2d 731 (1949) ; State v. Cromwell,
72 N.D. 565, 9 N.W.2d 914 (1943) ; Moore v. Sutton, 185 Va. 48, 39 S.E.2d 348 (1946).
73. Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 183 Atl. 534 (1936).
74. State Board of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind. 552, 44 N.E.2d 972(1942). For similar holdings see Noble v. Davis, 204 Ark. 156, 161 S.W.2d 189(1942); Duncan v. Des Moines, 222 Iowa 218, 268 N.W. 547 (1936); State v.
Greeson, 174 Tenn. 178, 124 S.W.2d 253 (1939). Contra: Board of Barber Examinefs
v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485 (1938); Herrin v. Arnold, 183 Okla. 392, 82
P.2d 977 (1938) ; State v. McMasters, 204 Minn. 438, 283 N.W. 767 (1939); Arnold
v. Board of Barber Examiners, 45 N.M. 57, 109 P.2d 779 (1941).
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no relation to health, welfare or safety.75 On other occasions invalida-
tion of such enactments has" been justified on the basis that the measures
concerned seek to regulate "private business" or "common callings," or
"business not affected with a public interest." 76 Obviously these pro-
nouncements are not reasons but conclusions. Whether enactments
regulating certain trades and occupations have any relation to health
and welfare is a matter which in most instances requires the careful
collecting, presentation, and analysis of many social-economic facts. To
say a business is a "common calling" or a "private business" is to ignore
the crucial point at issue, namely, whether the legislature could reasonably
conclude that the general welfare warranted the enactment in question.
In fact, this is now the test followed by the Supreme Court, at least
in so far as the Nebbia case is controlling, for in that controversy,
speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Roberts stated:
The phrase "affected with a public interest" can, in the nature
of things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate
reason, is subject to control for the public good. In several of
the decisions of this court wherein the expressions "affected
with a public interest," and "clothed with a public use," have
been brought forward as the criteria of the validity of price
control, it has been admitted that they are not susceptible of
definition and form an unsatisfactory test of the constitution-
ality of legislation directed at business practices or prices.
These decisions must rest, finally, upon the basis that the re-
quirements of due process were not met because the laws were
found arbitrary in their operation and effect. But there can be
no doubt that upon proper occasion and by appropriate measures
the state may regulate a business in any of its aspects, includ-
ing the prices to be charged for the products or commodities
it sells.77
Although the analytical merits of many of the opinions which con-
clude that various licensing and regulatory measures violate due process
requirements are unsatisfactory, these judicial pronouncements, taken as
a whole, leave no doubt as to one of the factors which aided in shaping
the results reached. Again, we find the courts repeatedly revealing that
in their opinion many of these measures are but the culmination of efforts
75. E.g., Saidel v. Village of Tupper Lake, 254 App.Div. 22, 4 N.Y.S.2d 814
(3d Dep't 1938).
76. This is especially true of the photography cases noted in footnote 72. See
also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1931); Bessette v. People, 193
Ill. 63, 62 N.E. 215 (1901) ; Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 183 Atl. 534 (1936).
77. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536-537 (1933). For an earlier expression
of this position see the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis in New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 302 (1931).
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exerted by various pressure groups for the purposes of enhancing their
economic position. While most such opinions reflect that the justices
are aware that this fact alone should not serve to condemn the challenged
legislation, (If it were, what laws would survive?) it seems quite obvious
that often the consciousness of the source or the immediate effect of
specific measures serves to guide and color the courts' reasoning. It is
entirely understandable that justices find it easier to conclude that this
ordinance or that statute has no relation to public health or welfare when
they note that it was lobbied through by a certain group or when they
observe that its immediate and direct benefits will fall on a narrow seg-
ment of the economy.
In concluding that measures of this nature cannot be sustained,
courts have on occasion felt called upon to comment on the lawmaking
processes. Their decisions, these spokesmen maintain, do not reflect on
the integrity and good faith of the legislature, but simply recognize
that legislators pressed by mountainous work loads crowded into short
terms are frequently prevailed upon by various pressure groups who
assert with much vigor that the measures they support are necessary for
the welfare of the public.78
While some will criticize the attitude which is revealed by comments
such as these on the basis that an approach actively shaped by this concept
lends itself to the free use of the judicial veto, it is unfortunately true
that these remarks reflect an all too accurate picture of the lawmaking
processes. As long, as legislators act irresponsibly, as long as they serve
as pawns for given pressure groups, the judiciary will continue to step
in to nullify certain enactments. In fact, the courts have no other choice
if they are to perform their constitutional duty of protecting minorities
against the indiscriminate acts of temporary majorities. Justices must
carefully ascertain whether each measure that is challenged "was ad-
dressed to a legitimate end," that is, that it was not enacted "for the
mere advantage of particular individuals but for the protection of a basic
interest of society."' 79 Light is shed on this question by observing the
manner by which and the atmosphere in which a particular law was
given birth.
In conclusion, it is obvious that despite occasional setbacks result-
ing from the narrow construction of delegated power or from judicially
construed collisions with the interstate commerce clause, equal protec-
tion requirements, or the demands of due process, the number of profes-
78. See especially State v. Cromwell, 72 N.D. 565, 9 N.W.2d 915 (1943); also
see State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940).
79. Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 445 (1933).
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sions, occupations, trades and economic-geographic areas subject to regu-
lations, licensing requirements, and other restrictions continues to
increase. Ironically enough this increase, as has been noted, is frequently
the product of pressure brought by those who are most persistent in
attacking the augmentation of government in business. It would seem
that if these attackers are sincere in their condemnation, they more
than any others possess the key to retarding such growth, for a reduc-
tion in their demands would automatically reduce the output of measures
which lead to more governmental supervision and control.
Unfortunately, such a suggestion is not a palatable one. For one
thing, economic groups are notoriously short-sighted. They usually owe
their origin to the common desire to secure immediate favors and privi-
leges, and their continued existence and, more significantly, the perpetua-
tion of their leaders in office depends upon the degree of success with
which their demands are met. In addition, many existing groups with
considerable justice maintain their requests must be satisfied if they are
to survive economically because on previous occasions governmental
privileges were enacted which aided in giving their competitors undue
advantage. The cycle is already in existence. To expect certain groups
to refrain from making demands when other organizations have received
valuable benefits is expecting too much of human nature.
What then is the solution to the problem posed by the increased
and increasing number of haphazard restrictive measures ground out by
the legislative mills? While the answer is not a simple one, the foregoing
observations do suggest an avenue of approach. It should be obvious that
whether we like it or not the era of governmental supervision of trade
areas, of business practices, and of the entrance of new competitors into
given occupations and professions is here to stay. Admittedly, this is a
difficult reality for many to face, yet the truth is that economic groups
and the public at large have too much at stake to make possible the
renunciation by government of its current role on the economic scene.
In view of this fact, it is recommended that intensive, yet comprehensive,
studies be made by competent economists and political scientists to
evaluate the 6conomic effects of measures similar to those noted in this
article. The immediate consequences of such a survey should be the
equalization of obvious and indefensible inequities, existing because of
such measures. Wide publicity concerning the impact of this legislation
on the economy should force some pressure groups to temper their more
extreme demands, and should make their more responsible leaders, who
often are lawyers, take greater cognizance of the long-term consequences
of their requests. Such publicity should further serve to increase legis-
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lators' awareness of the cumulative results of their acts and should thus
serve to make them somewhat less ready to acquiesce in the more
flagrantly selfish demands of various groups. It should also result in
writing into many of these proposals stipulations designed to extend
greater consideration to the general public.
Cynic will, of course, dismiss the preceding recommendation with
the comment that it places too much faith in public information and
education. If they are correct, then we must expect a continuation of hit
or miss special interest legislation with little immediate concern as to the
consequences and a perpetuation of unpredictable judicial intervention,
which is at best highly unsatisfactory to lawyers and to the groups imme-
diately concerned. It may be, however, that the cynics are wrong, and
because they may be wrong the suggested solution may well be worth the
talents and expense necessary for its execution.
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